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f41 C.2d 229; 259 P.2d 4351

in effect.'' As so modified the judgment is affirmed.
fendant Paul Grosso is to bear the costs of this appeal.
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De-

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 22312.

In Bank.

July 7, 1953.]

NAN VIC'rORIA TRUE CONNOR, Respondent, v. PAUL
,J. GROSSO et al., Appellants.
[1] Husband and Wife-Liability for Torts.-Mere fact that one
defendant is wife of other and holds property with him as a
joint tenant does not establish her liability for a tort committed by him.
[2a, 2b] Trespass-Evidence.-vVhere evidence relating to amount
of dirt, rocks and other debris dumped on plaintiff's property
indicates that some of such material was dumped by persons
other than defendants, a finding that defendants dumped all
of it is without support.
[3] Id.-Evidence.-Where there is a conflict of evidence as to
amount of dirt dumped on plaintiff's property, trier of fact
could resolve such conflict in favor of plaintiff.
[4] Id.-Damages.-A defendant sued for damages for injuries to
real property should be required to pay cost of removing any
slippage that may reasonably occur in course of removing dirt
and other debris which he dumped on plaintiff's property.
[5] Id.-Parties.-Where defendant in dumping dirt on plaintiff's
land, did not act in concert with other persons dumping dirt
on plaintiff's land, he cannot be required to pay for removal
of dirt dumped by them.
[6] New Trial-Award as to Part of Issues-Damages.-Where
defendant has had a fair trial on issue of liability for dumping
dirt on plaintiff's property, the findings on that issue are amply
supported by the evidence, and the only issue on which a
[1] Liability of wife for husband's torts by virtue of mere
ownership of property in connection with which tort occurred,
note, 12 A.L.R. 1459, 1463. See, also, Cal.Jur., Husband and Wife,
§ 6; Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 487.
[ 6] See Cal.Jur., New Trial, § 16; Am.Jur., New Trial, § 21 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife,§ 13; [2, 3] Trespass,§ 24; [4] Trespass, § 26; [5] Trespass, § 11; [6] New Trial,
§ 15.1.
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judgment for plaintiff is not supported by the evidence is the
amount of compensatory damages, a new trial may he ordered
only as to issue of such damages.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action for damag·es for injuries to real property. Judgment
against defendant Madolyn A. Grosso reversed with directions
that judgment be entered in her favor; judgment against defendant Paul A. Grosso reversed with directions for retrial on
issue of compensatory damages only.
W. P. Smith and Henry F. Walker for Appellants.
Stanton, Stanton & W elbourn for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-This action was consolidated for trial with
Herzog v. Grosso, ante, p. 219 [259 P.2d 429]. The trial
court found that defendants Paul Grosso and Madolyn Grosso
deposited 3,184 cubic yards of material on plaintiff Nan
Connor's property and entered judgment against both defendants for $4,362.08.
Defendant Madolyn Grosso contends that the award of
damages against her is not supported by the evidence.* We
agree. [1] The fact that Paul Grosso was her husband
and that he held the property with her as a joint tenant does
not establish her liability. (Goldman v. House, 93 Cal.App.
2d 572, 576 [209 P.2d 639] ; Citizens State Bank v. Hoffman,
44 Cal.App.2d 854, 855 [113 P.2d 211] .) In Brown v. Oxtoby,
45 Cal.App.2d 702, 709 [114 P.2d 622], and similar cases relied
upon by plaintiff, there was evidence that the wife actively
participated in the tort, or that the husband acted as her
agent, or that she ratified his conduct. Plaintiff pleaded a
cause of action against Madolyn Grosso, but no evidence was
introduced to support her allegations, although the case was
vigorously contested and on trial for seven days. The trial
court will therefore be directed to enter judgment for Madolyn
Grosso. (Code Civ. Proc., §53; see Burtis v. Universal Pictures Co., Inc., 40 Cal.2d 823, 835 [256 P.2d 933].)
[2a] The trial court found that defendants "dumped upon
*In the companion case of Herzog v. Grosso, ante, p. 219 [259 P.2d
429], the award of damages was against Paul Grosso only.

July 1953]

CoNNOR v. GRosso

231

[41 C.2d 229; 259 P.2d 4351

said real property of plaintiff 3,184 cubic yards of dirt, rocks
and other debris'' and that the ''cost of removal of said
material so unlawfully dumped upon said real property of
plaintiff, including slippage necessarily incidental to such
removal, is the sum of $4,362.08." Defendants' contention
that this finding is not supported by substantial evidence is
sustained by the record. Before defendants acquired their
property, a considerable amount of dirt had already been
dumped on the Connor property by Herzog and Mrs. Schneider
in the course of building the road on parcel 3, filling in the
ground near the telephone pole, and leveling land between
the road on parcels 2 and 3 and the road to the top of the
hill. Defendants acquired the hilltop property in March,
1949. Defendant Paul Grosso dumped dirt on the Connor
property in November, 1949, when he regraded his road, and
again in September, 1950, when he built the ramp across the
fill.
[3] One witness, Bert Willis, testified that to restore the
Connor property to its natural condition by removing all
of the fill and the dirt that would fall in upon removal
thereof, would require excavation of 3,184 cubic yards of
dirt at a cost of $4,362.08.* Another witness, Kenneth Cook,
testified that the last fill, in September, 1950, amounted to
1,570¥2 yards. According to Willis, removal of 1,5701;2 yards
would cost $2,625.84. Witnesses called by defendants testified
that Grosso dumped only 150 yards of dirt on the Connor
property but the trier of fact could, of course, resolve the
conflict in the evidence in favor of plaintiff. Neither party
introduced evidence showing the depreciation in value of
plaintiff's property caused by the dumping of the dirt.
[ 4] Defendant, of course, should be required to pay the
cost of removing any slippage that may reasonably occur in
the course of removing the material that he dumped on plain*Willis testified that he based his computation on the amount of filled
ground lying between the red line and the dotted line on plaintiff's exhibit C-2. That exhibit is a survey map prepared by witness Cook. He
testified that the red line represented the boundary between the Connor
property and parcels 2 and 3, and that the dotted line indicated the
bottom of the fill on the Connor property. Cook stated that he dug four
test holes in the fill and concluded that only part of the dirt in the fill
could be attributed to the last dumping on the Connor land.
The trial court asked Willis, ''I take it from your testimony so far,
Mr. Willis, that what you are conveying is that it would require the
removal of 3,184 yards to restore the Connor property to its original
ground level." (Emphasis added.) The witness replied, "That is right,
sir.''
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tiff's property. The evidence, viewed most favorably to plaintiff, shows that Grosso actually dumped 1,570% cubic yards
of material on plaintiff's property and that to remove all the
fill, including material dumped by other persons, plus the
dirt that would slide down the hill from parcels 2 and 3 during such removal, it would be necessary to excavate 3,184
cubic yards. There is no evidence that the material previously
dumped by other persons, lying under the dirt subsequently
dumped by Grosso, would have to be removed in order to
remove the dirt dumped by him. Nor is there any evidence
to show the amount of dirt that will slide down the hill
if only the 1,570% yards dumped by Grosso were removed.
[5] Since Grosso did not act in concert with the other persons dumping dirt on the Connor land, he cannot be required
to pay for removal of the dirt dumped by them. (Slater v.
Pacific American Oil Co., 212 Cal. 648, 654 [300 P. 31];
Prosser, Torts, p. 333.) [2b] The judgment holds Grosso
responsible for all the dirt fill on the Connor property and is
thus without adequate support in the evidence.
[6] Defendant argues that the error in the award of
damages requires a complete new trial. AfteF a lengthy
trial, the trial court resolved the question of liability in favor
of plaintiff and the question of exemplary damages in favor
of defendants. The only issue on which the judgment is not
supported by the evidence is the amount of compensatory
damages, and we are of the opinion that a separate trial on
that issue will expedite the administration of justice and will
not deny defendant Paul Grosso a fair trial, for he has already
had a fair trial on the issue of liability, and the trial court's
findings on that issue are amply supported by the evidence.
The judgment against defendant Madolyn A. Grosso is
reversed, and the trial court is directed to enter judgment
in her favor. The judgment against defendant Paul A.
Grosso is reversed, and the trial court is directed to retry
the issue of compensatory damages only. Madolyn Grosso
shall recover her costs on appeal. The other parties shall
bear their own costs.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
SCHAUER, J .--I dissent. I take particular exception to
the order directing the trial court to enter judgment in favor
of Madolyn Grosso. Even if we can properly conclude that
the evidence on this record is insufficient to support the
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judgment against her we have no right to assume that on a
new trial no additional evidence against her could be produced.
It further appears to me to be inaccurate to state in the
opinion that '' 'l'he only issue on which the judgment is not
supported by the evidence is the amount of compensatory
damages . . . '' and at the same time to order a new trial on
the issue of the amount of compensatory damages as against
Paul Grosso while directing a judgment in favor of Madolyn.
In my view, on the state of the record, and on the facts
and law stated in the majority opinion, there should be a
complete new trial on all issues as to all parties.
CAR'l'ER, J.-I dissent.
I think it is clear that the evidence is sufficient to support
the award of damages and a new trial on that issue should
not be ordered.
The majority opinion proceeds upon the theory that plaintiff was not entitled to the cost of removing more dirt than
was actually dumped on her property even though it would
require the removal of the additional amount to effectively
remove the amount dumped and that there is no evidence
that the removal of the additional amount was necessary to
effectively remove the amount dumped.
The nrst proposition is manifestly untenable. It is the
same as saying in a case where plaintiff was entitled to damages for an injury to the motor of his car that he could recover for the damage to the motor but not the expense of
repairing it where part of the cost of repair was the removal
and replacement of other parts although necessary to repair
the motor. The evidence clearly supports the necessity of removing the additional soil.
The majority holds that there was insufficient evidence to
support the trial court's finding that defendant Grosso
dumped 3,184 yards of soil on plaintiff's property and hence
damaged her in the sum of $4,367 .08, being arrived at by
computing the cost of removal of the dirt at $1.37 per yard.
There is enough evidence, on the theory that while the total
yardage of soil dumped on plaintiff's land may have been
1,570% instead of 3,184, it would require the removal of the
latter amount because to remove effectively the 1,570 yards,
an additional amount, up to the 3,184 yards, must be removed because of the sliding of other soil onto plaintiff's
land as the result of removing the 1,570 yards.
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While Cook testified that 1,570 yards had been dumped
on plaintiff's land, plaintiff's expert (Willis) on removal of
the soil and the cost thereof, testified:
"Q. Now, at my request, Mr. Willis, did you make an estimate of the amount of filled ground represented on this map
that I have referred to, Plaintiffs' Exhibit C-2, that lies between the Connor property line or the red line and the mark
with the dotted line entitled 'rroe of spill from road' 1"
''THE CouRT: ·what end?
"MR. STAN'TON: \Vell, all the ground enclosed within that
curved line and the red line.
''A. Yes, I did, but in addition to that I went back to the
nattmil contour of the land. You couldn't excavate it to
you.r property line without sliding back of your property
line, so we went back of the property line to the orig·inal contours of the hill.
"Q. Why did you do that, Mr. Willis~ A. 'l'o excavate at a
vertical line at the property line, you couldn't hold the matM·ial above it, yon would slide clown into the property.
"Q. In other words, in making your estimate of yardage,
yon had in mind the removal of that dirt. Is that correct 1
A. That is right.
'' Q. Then if you removed right along the property line,
it is your best estimate that the other dirt would fall into
place and that would have to be removed as well? A. That
is right.
"Q. Now, you were asked to estimate the amount of cubic
yards of dirt necessary to remove along that property line,
were you not~ A. That is right.
'' Q. What was your estimate of the total number of cubic
yards of earth? A. 3184 cubic yards.
"Q. That includes not only the amount of earth in the fill
itself, but also the yardage of earth which you estimate would
fall into the fill, were the present fill in the Connor property
removed? A. Yes.'' (Emphasis added.)
''THE CouRT: I take it from your testimony so far, Mr.
·willis, that what you are conveying is that it would require
the removal of 3184 yards to restore the Connor property
to its original ground level.''
That testimony is at least reasonably susceptible of the
construction that in order to remove the soil dumped on the
land by Grosso it would be necessary to remove the soil to
the original contour of the land because otherwise if you
removed only the part dumped, other soil would slide down
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leaving soil on the property the same as before; that to remove all of the soil necessary to restore plaintiff's land, 3,184
yards must be removed. This is in accord with the finding
of the trial court.
This being the state of the record, there is ample evidence
to support the finding of the trial court as to the amount
of damages suffered by plaintiff and the judgment should.
therefore, be affirmed.

[L. A. No. 22656.

In Bank.

July 7, 1953.]

HELEN C. THOMPSON, Appellant, v. CITY OF LONG
BEACH et al., Respondents.
[1] Municipal Corporations-Employees-Removal- Proceedings.
-Municipal civil service board has authority to proceed with
hearing of dismissal charges against stenographer in classified
civil service, notwithstanding such charges are preferred by
chairman of board rather than by city manager, where under
city charter the power to suspend or dismiss person in classified civil service is vested in either head of department or city
manager, and any qualified elector may file written charges.
[2] Administrative Law-Judicial Review-Trial De Novo.-A dismissed civil service employee seeking to compel city to permit
~her to resume her duties is not entitled to a trial de novo in the
superior court, but only to a review of proceedings before
local board acting as a quasi-judicial body empowered to make
final adjudications of fact in connection with matters properly
submitted to it.
[3] !d.-Judicial Review-Hearing.-On judicial review of order
of local administrative body, trial court does not have right
' to judge of intrinsic value of evidence or to weigh it; its power
·is confined to determining whether there was substantial evidence before board to sustain its findings.
[4] !d.-Judicial Review-Hearing.-In reviewing proceedings before local administrative board, court is bound to disregard
evidence contrary to that received in support of findings of
board.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law and Procedure, § 233;
Am.Jur., Public Administrative Law, § 223.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Municipal Corporations,§ 311; [2-4]
Administrative Law, § 22; [ 5, 6] Evidence, § 483; [7] Evidence,
§ 497; [8-10, 13] Municipal Corporations, § 313; [11] Municipal
Corporations, § 307; [12] Evidence, § 563; Witnesses, § 281.

